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Euclid’s Geometry: the Case of 
Contradiction 
Chris Mortensen 
This paper surveys Euclid’s geometry. After raising philosophical questions 
about the relation between the diagrams and the words, the question is raised 
concerning how there can be a diagram appropriate to a reductio ad absurdum 
proof, which by definition operates with a contradiction. This leads us to 
discover two different kinds of proof of contradiction, one kind in Euclid’s 
reductios, and the other kind features in the images of the Impossible Figures 
movement.  
1. Introduction
Euclid’s Elements is a monumental achievement, and so early too! It presents 
us with a wealth of definitions, axioms and especially proofs of Propositions; 
and, as we will see, gives rise to meta-questions of philosophical interest. We 
will work our way through some of these, before arriving at a place which 
enables us to raise questions about an area of geometry, Impossible Figures, 
which Euclid did not know about, but which his work certainly bears on.  
2. What are Euclid’s words about?
Inspection of the Elements reveals two kinds of content: diagrams, and words 
including names for parts of diagrams, such as points, lines, circles, areas. 
The words are used to state and prove Propositions, expressed in words, 
which are ostensibly about the diagrams.  
What are the words really “about”? Words can be about anything and 
that is their strength. Euclid’s words are about diagrams and their parts, it 
might seem. But what are these? Perhaps perfect Platonic shapes or 
geometrical forms? Surely not: Platonism might deliver perfect shapes but 
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the acausality of Platonic forms, if acausal they be, cannot account for how 
we interact with them. Physical shapes on a page? No, if only because 
physical diagrams, drawn by hand or machine, lack the perfection of form 
that would seem to be possessed by the subject matter of Euclidean 
Propositions and proofs.  
But there is a more plausible answer. Assuming that space is a real thing, 
which is a reasonable position with many important supporters from 
Newton to Nerlich, we can identify perfect lines, circles, spheres and the like, 
as parts of space. For example, we learn from Descartes’ methods that perfect 
circles around the origin are given as collections of points corresponding to 
equations of the form x2+y2=r2, where r is the radius and x and y are the x- 
and y- coordinates respectively. In this account, lines and other parts of 
space are not Platonist universals, they are mereological wholes of points. 
There is no denying, of course, that there are prima facie epistemological 
problems with these items; but on the other hand postulation of them in 
causally-relevant physical theory is well-entrenched. Euclid himself defined 
a point as “that which has no part” (Book 1 Def 1: he meant of course no 
proper part, but this is not seen in a diagram, since “points” in a drawn 
diagram have proper parts). He also defined a line as “breadthless length” 
(Def 2) and “the extremities of a line are points” (Def 3): Euclid seems to have 
been thoroughly realist about geometrical items, while at the same time 
denying that they are diagrams and their parts. 
3. What are the diagrams for?
To reinforce an earlier point, if Propositions and their proofs are about 
perfectly-shaped parts of space, then they are not about drawn physical 
diagrams and their parts, because diagrams are not perfectly shaped. But if 
that is so, then why are diagrams illuminating? What is their use? It is 
undoubted that diagrams are illuminating, we have only to imagine the 
Elements with the diagrams removed: something would be grievously 
lacking.   
How are diagrams illuminating? One obvious thing to say is that 
diagrams approximate the perfect shapes in space. They improve the 
understanding by displaying a shape which is in a natural way like the 
perfect shape. Likeness here would seem to be some sort of root-mean-
square deviation: crudely, the more the deviation around some mean, the 
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less the likeness. Importantly, words are not like diagrams. They employ a 
different mode of representation. Nelson Goodman (1968) rather nailed this 
one, I think: words represent shapes by pure convention, whereas diagrams 
represent shapes using a different mechanism, exemplification, by giving you 
something like what is referred to. Goodman went further in claiming that 
resemblance was itself conventional, but we will not get entangled in that 
particular thicket, except to say that with geometrical diagrams, the root-
mean-square speculation of likeness maybe has rather better prospects than 
with pictures in general.  
So, Propositions and their proofs need diagrams, in the sense that in 
understanding a diagram, we have a unique and less conventional mode of 
understanding of the associated Proposition, namely exemplification. The 
Propositions are of course words themselves. Again, proofs also need words 
to yield understanding, if only because their related Propositions are stated 
in words. I am inclined to go further, however, and say that without seeing 
or imagining a diagram there is no real understanding of a Proposition or its 
proof. 
We take note of the generality problem about diagrams, which has seemed 
to some to pose a difficulty. How can one diagram per Proposition be 
enough? Shapes in space come in different sizes, orientations and with 
different internal features. No one diagram would apply to them all, surely, 
even if they are associated with the same Proposition. But this is too quick, 
surely. It is hardly the case that a diagram is necessary and sufficient for a 
proof, so that, for example, you would need different diagram sizes to 
illustrate proofs of the one Proposition applying to different sized shapes. If 
there is no appeal in the Proposition and proof to a particular feature of the 
diagram (e.g. size, orientation) then this feature can be ignored, that is can 
be generalised over.  
4. To get the right words off the diagram
Apart from being necessary for full understanding, is there any role for a 
diagram in supplying verifications or justifications to steps in a proof? One 
useful and influential contribution to this matter is due to Kenneth Manders 
(1995). He distinguishes exact features of a diagram from co-exact features. 
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The distinction is in terms of what it is permitted to be “read off” from a 
diagram, to be used as a premiss in a proof without further justification.
Manders’ main point is that exact features (e.g. equality of lengths of lines 
or angles, straightness of lines, right angles, circles) are too exact for us to be 
justified in loading a perceptual feature from a diagram to the words of a 
proof. Contrast this with co-exact features (e.g. inequalities, incidences or 
proper inclusions) which can be appreciated over a range of variation of 
features). In Manders’ words, co-exact features are “unaffected by some 
range of every continuous variation of a specified diagram” (1995:92). This 
is a vaguer or looser feature than exactness, but must surely be necessary if 
hand-drawn diagrams are to illuminate proofs to the point of justification by 
perception of particular steps.  
An example of an exact feature is given in the very first Book 1 
Proposition 1. Euclid shows that on any (finite) straight line there can be 
constructed an equilateral triangle with the given line as one of its sides. The 
equality of the sides is an exact feature, but we cannot read it off a diagram, 
we have to prove it. 
Diagram 1: Book 1, Proposition 1 
Proof: Let the given line be AB. Construct a circle with centre A and 
radius AB. Construct a second circle with centre B and radius AB. The circles 
intersect in a point C. Join the straight lines AC and BC. The required 
equilateral triangle is ABC. It is equilateral since AB=AC being both radii of 
a circle, and BA=BC being radii of the other circle.  
Remark: The equality of AB and BA seems to have been taken for granted 
by Euclid.  
An example of a co-exact feature can be found in Book 1 Proposition 16. 
Euclid shows that, for any triangle, if one of the sides is extended, the exterior 
angle is greater than either of the interior and opposite angles.  
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Diagram 2: Book 1, Proposition 16 
 
Proof: Let the given triangle be ABC, and let BC be the extended side, 
extended to D. Bisect AC at E, and join BE, extending it to BF where BE=EF. 
Extend AC an arbitrary distance to G. Since AE=EC and BE=EF and angle 
AEB=angle FEC (Prop 15), the triangles ABE and FEC are congruent (or 
equal, Euclid: Prop 4). Thus corresponding angles BAE and ECF are equal. 
But angle ECD > angle ECF (co-exact observation). Hence angle ACD > angle 
BAE.  
Remarks: (1) It is plain that the proof can be re-run for the other sides 
being extended – thus generality. (2) The co-exact observation about angles 
at the second-last step also appeals to Euclid’s Common Notion 5 “The 
whole is greater than the part”, which however does not mention angles. (3) 
This step is characteristic of co-exactness: it is the diagram that justifies the 
step in the argument. (4) Euclid also has a definition of angle, the historical 
complexities of which we do not pursue (see Heath’s careful discussion in 
Book 1, 176–180). 
 
5. An aside: Venn diagrams 
 
It is useful to have a contrasting perspective on Venn diagrams, which 
likewise have diagrams plus text, and have a bearing on proofs including 
Euclidean proofs (for a useful discussion of the differences see Shin & 
Lemon, 2003). Aristotle’s four categorical forms for text were: All A are B, 
No A are B, Some A is B, and Some A is not B. Each of these can be 
represented diagramatically as differing relationships between areas 
(typically circles) representing the sets (extensions) associated with the  
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terms A and B. Arguments with two premisses and conclusion in the above 
categorical forms were called syllogisms. Venn diagrams facilitate testing the 
validity and invalidity of arguments in text employing only categorical 
forms, for any number of premisses from one up including syllogisms. Venn 
diagrams have topological features, specifically inclusion and exclusion, 
which enable validity and invalidity to be read off the page.  
In this limited sense Venn diagrams can be said to have co-exact features. 
Hence, one might speculate whether to generalise the concepts of co-
exactness and exactness to apply to Venn diagrams as well. Moreover, since 
Euclidean proofs employ a background logic including at least syllogistic 
logic, it might be argued that a full Euclidean proof must include one or more 
Venn diagrams to justify the logical steps. For a simple example, Heath 
allows as part of the proof of Proposition 6 below the (valid) one-premiss 
argument: All non-A are non-B, so all B are A.  
However, while Venn diagrams can assist following a proof by enabling 
reading text off the page, the features being described are different from 
Euclidean proofs, so that generalisation of the concept of co-exactness is not 
obvious (thanks to a referee for raising this point). Furthermore, while 
Aristotle himself described the theory of syllogisms, he did not employ Venn 
diagrams which came many centuries later. That is, it is possible to employ 
the logical steps in Aristotle’s arguments without assistance from Venn 
diagrams. In contrast, as we have seen, Euclidean diagrams seem to be 
essential for understanding Euclidean proofs. 
6. Reductio arguments
Now we are closing in on our main conclusion concerning inconsistency. 
Manders discusses the role of reductio arguments. He sees a prima facie 
problem. How can a diagram illustrate a proof involving the supposition of 
a reductio? After all, a reductio begins with an assumption that the aimed-at 
Conclusion is false, and shows that a contradiction follows. How then is the 
contra-theorem to be illustrated, if it is never exemplified?  
Manders (1995) allows that the diagram for a reductio CAN illustrate a 
contradictory premiss for a reductio, but only indirectly. Manders’ (1995) 
idea is that co-exact features must be represented correctly, that is, what is 
read off from the co-exact features of the diagram is retained in the 
 77 
EUCLID’S GEOMETRY: THE CASE OF CONTRADICTION 
 
Conclusion of the reductio argument. In contrast, at least one exact feature 
can (indeed must!) be incorrectly drawn, that is the diagram lacks the feature 
attributed by the exact premiss. That way, the task of drawing a 
contradiction is avoided. One of Manders’ (1995) examples is the diagram in 
Heath of Book 1 Proposition 6. Euclid shows that if in a triangle two angles be 
equal to one another, the sides which subtend the equal angles will also be equal to 
one another. 
 
 
Diagram 3: Book 1, Proposition 6 
Proof. Let ABC be a triangle with angle ABC=angle ACB. It is required to 
prove that side AB=side AC. For suppose not for reductio. Then one of the 
sides is longer than the other (exact feature). Let it be AB > AC. Measure off 
BD along BA where BD=AC (exact feature, not represented on diagram). Join 
DC. Now, DB=AC and BC=CB and angle DBC=angle ACB (by stipulation), 
so then triangle DBC is equal (congruent) to ACB (by Prop 4). But this is 
absurd since by (co-exact) observation triangle DBC is less than (that is, a 
proper part of) triangle ACB. 
 
7. Impossible Figures 
 
Manders’ (1995) distinctions are useful. But there is more to be said in 
connection with the important twentieth-century development of 
Impossible Figures (IFs).  
The Impossible Figures movement got underway properly in 1934 when 
the young Swede Oscar Reutersvärd drew what has come to be called 
somewhat erroneously in the literature, the Penrose Triangle (see the top left 
of Diagram 5). An important contributor to the movement was the 
formidable M.C. Escher, but he was not the first. The terminology  
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“Impossible Figures”, IF, is due to Teddy Brunius, and is fairly settled by 
now, so we stick with that. Even so, the kind of impossibility which is up 
here, is not mere physical impossibility, that is contrary to natural law, but 
something stronger: incompatibility at least with logic or mathematics also 
(it is not intended here to beg the question either for or against logicism).   
It will help if look at some examples of IFs. The first example is by 
Escher’s student Bruno Ernst. 
 
 
Diagram 4: The Wearisome and the Easy Ways to the Top. Bruno Ernst (1984) 
Cutting a long story short, it is claimed here that there are five basic forms 
which can be simplified as follows. 
 
 
Diagram 5: Five basic forms of Impossible Figures  
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Of these five forms, schematised from the originals, the top three were 
first drawn by Oscar Reutersvärd. The top two left, the Penrose Triangle and 
the Stairway, were re-discovered by Roger Penrose in 1956. The bottom left, 
the Escher Cube, was drawn by M.C. Escher in his masterpiece Belvedere 
(1958). Bottom right is called the Steps, and is evidently a simplified version 
of Diagram 4 by Bruno Ernst. It is this which we concentrate on.  
Now the claim has been made that these are impossible. But clearly they 
are sitting there for all to see. So what is impossible about them?  
Many pictures have a content, and among contents there are 2-D contents 
and 3-D contents. 3-D contents are obtained when we project into the third 
dimension: good examples include perspective and occlusion. The 2-D 
aspects of the above images are obviously not impossible; but something is 
impossible about them, which indicates that it is the 3-D contents that are 
impossible. More exactly, what makes it impossible is that it has 
contradictory 3-D content: the mind projects a contradictory 3-D theory as 
part of its content, of how it seems. Euclid himself did not shirk the third 
dimension: Books XI-XII are about solid geometry.  
We claim here that these Impossible Figures do not have any existing 
examples in the 3-D physical world because they have contradictory 3-D 
content. Here is a quick proof for the case of the Ernst Steps. First the figure 
is lettered (taken from Mortensen, 2010:130). 
 
 
Diagram 6: The Steps lettered 
Proof of Contradiction. The argument goes: (1) a is vertical, (2) b is 
horizontal, (3) a is coplanar with b, since both lie in the plane ab, and (4) a 
and b arbitrarily extended do not meet. Note that the fourth premiss is 
necessary, since without it (1) – (3) are mutually consistent – a vertical and a 
horizontal can meet in the one plane, but not if they are skew to each other.   
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Taking (3) and (4) together, then, we have (5) that a and b are parallel. But 
then if a is vertical, so must be b. That contradicts (2), the horizontality of b. 
Note in passing that these premisses are all part of the 3-D contents of the 
image, that is why simple 2-D will not do.  
This argument can be seen in more detail in Mortensen (2010:130–133), 
along with arguments for contradictoriness in the cases of the other Forms 
(Chapters 9–15).  
One significant matter in this proof concerns the premiss that ab is a 
plane. That is right about the way the figure looks. But if the figure derives 
from a physical object, then it might be that ab is not a plane, but twists from 
horizontal to vertical without that being noticeable. Then there would be a 
consistent object as a source of the figure, the way the figure looks would be 
the way a certain consistent object looks. Indeed, one can see why this can 
arise in a consistent world: there seems to be a default setting in our 
perceptual apparatus; if a twist is not perceived, our perceiver defaults to 
flat.  
The same can be said for several of the other forms. It is well-known that 
it is possible to build objects which photograph looking like that (a possible 
exception is the Fork, top right of Diagram 5). For example, the Triangle can 
be built not-joined-up; but photographed from a particular angle gives the 
illusion that it looks joined up. Our perceptual apparatus obviously employs 
another default mechanism, whereby items at a small angular distance to 
one another look like they are also at a small radial distance to one another. 
It is easy to demonstrate this by lining up fingers from opposite hands so 
that they look touching even though far apart.  
But here is an important point: Reutersvärd was not drawing illusory aspects 
of existing physical objects: he made his figures up. In so doing, he showed that 
it was possible to have contradictory visual content independently of there 
being any physical objects that might look that way from a preferred aspect. 
As Reutersvärd noted himself, his figures were not illusions. 
 
8. Reductio or proof of contradiction?  
 
So we come down to this. What is so special about the above proof of 
contradiction of The Steps? Is it no more than just another reductio? Just a   
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proof that The Steps diagram has no existing exemplar? Is that all there is to 
Impossible Figures?  
Euclid’s reductio suppositions were not intended to demonstrate the non-
existence of physical objects looking a certain way. They were intended to 
lead to a rejection of the reductio supposition, in the context of retaining the 
remaining antededent suppositions. For example, considering Proposition 6 
above, Euclid assumes that angle ABC=angle ACB, and for the reductio, he 
supposes side AB≠side AC. On deducing the contradiction, he rejects the 
latter supposition. 
In contrast, for the IFs we have a proof of contradiction, from which it 
follows that no such 3-D object, one having the properties that the 3-D 
content has, exists. BUT at the same time the premisses are a “faithful” or 
“correct” report of the 3-D content, of the how-it-seems, its seemingness. Is 
this a kind of INTERNAL “truth”?  
I don’t have a problem with internal “truth”, as long as it isn’t conflated 
with the real thing, truth without the scare quotes. Sherlock Holmes lived in 
Baker Street, except not truly, because no-one of the name lived there. The 
internal truth here derives from words to that effect being included in a 
declared piece of fiction, or following from same, or satisfying some other 
constraints, declared or tacit. Humans have a great liking for playing with 
content without commitment to its truth: novels, films, paintings, diagrams, 
Impossible Figures (even mathematics, I would venture to claim). To avoid 
commitment to truth all you have to do is to qualify the narrative with “Once 
upon a time …”. For this reason I weary of having to explain to people of a 
phenomenological persuasion: “But it isn’t really TRUE!!”. And I urge the 
attempt to avoid describing internal truth as a kind of truth, or you will get 
locked into your own perspective. The temptation is there, I acknowledge, it 
derives from needing an internal standard separating as Holmes’ residence 
Baker Street from, say, Trafalgar Square (otherwise, chaos). But the internal 
standards are generally weaker than (external) truth, and subject to a greater 
level of convention.  
So we have two different sorts of proof of contradiction, I suggest, but 
with overlaps. Euclid’s reductio aims to prove a Proposition by rejecting its 
opposite as leading to a contradiction. It does not seek to demonstrate a 
paradox. The Steps proof does aim at showing that a certain thing does not 
exist: but in a sense this is secondary to the demonstration of the   
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contradiction as a coherent contradictory narrative. Ipso facto the premisses 
of the Steps proof can be read off, since the premisses report how it seems. 
In this sense its premisses are co-exact, I would say: the co-exactness of 
premisses as the guarantee of their correctness is to be read off into the 
narrative. Thus, the attitude to contradiction is different, the Steps is a 
demonstration that humans willingly entertain contradictory contents.  
But there is another difference too. It isn’t obvious that there is the scope 
for variation in premisses of the Steps, i.e. that there is in a reductio in 
Manders’ sense. Certainly Diagrams can be made of different sizes and 
orientations, but it isn’t clear that there is the sort of scope for variation that 
Proposition 16 shows.  
One final similarity is the 3-D aspect. The Euclidean examples above do 
not involve projection into 3-D, though Euclid did not shirk 3-D: from Book 
XI on there is discussed solid geometry. One difference here, however, is 
that a large class of occlusion paradoxes, namely paradoxes that depend on 
occlusion for their paradoxicality, are not addressed by Euclid. Needless to 
say, however, occlusion is an important mechanism of 3-D content. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
We have discussed three contrasting ways in which words and geometrical 
diagrams relate to one another.  In particular, we have seen that Manders’ 
analysis provides us with tools for analysing Euclid’s use of proof by 
contradiction. We also see that this manifests itself in a difference with proof 
by contradiction in the case of Impossible Figures.  
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